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Abstract
In this paper we study the typical dilemma of social coordination between a risk-
dominant convention and a payoff-dominant convention. In particular, we consider
a model where a population of agents play a coordination game over time, choosing
both the action and the network of agents with whom to interact. The main modelling
novelties with respect to the existing literature are: (i) agents come in two distinct
types, (ii) the interaction with a different type is costly, and (iii) an agent’s type is
unobservable prior to interaction. We show that when the cost of interacting with a
different type is small with respect to the payoff of coordination, the payoff-dominant
convention is the only stochastically stable convention; instead, when the cost of in-
teracting with a different type is large, the only stochastically stable conventions are
those where all agents of one type play the payoff-dominant action and all agents of
the other type play the risk-dominant action.
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Motivation. Social and economic interactions often require participants to coordinate
their actions. Conventions specifying on what side to drive or how to share the product of
joint work, and standards such as software or hardware platforms are examples, among many,
of successful coordination. In this kind of situations coordination is an inherently strategic
issue, giving rise to coordination games with a multiplicity of Nash equilibria, which can be
seen as distinct conventions. A social dilemma that often arises in this setting is between a
payoff-dominant action, which pays a higher payoff if the associated equilibrium is actually
played, and a risk-dominant action, which performs better if out-of-equilibrium play happens
(Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). Which of these equilibria is more likely to emerge in the long
run has been a matter of study in evolutionary game theory.
Most of the related research so far has focused on identifying conditions that lead to
the emergence of either the payoff-dominant or the risk-dominant convention. However, in
many real situations both conventions persist for a long time (as discussed, for instance, in
Sugden, 1995 and Goyal and Janssen, 1997). Also, agents are rarely fully homogeneous, being
often characterized by a variety of traits that can affect the result of the social interaction.
Sometimes such traits are not easily observable before interaction takes place, as it may be
the case for preferences, religion or cultural heritage. This feature can help to explain the
coexistence of conventions.
Indeed, what we typically observe in real life interactions is the formation of clusters
of agents that are homogeneous with respect to these traits, despite their unobservability
prior to interaction. Agents often adopt distinctive actions that end up to be conventions
in their cluster, e.g., dress, appearance, jargon, diet, rituals, meeting places, etc. Some of
these conventions can appear to be inferior choices but, nevertheless, they are adopted. The
fact that these distinctive actions are endogenously chosen by the agents (in contrast with
types that are instead exogenously given) and, in many cases, are also easily observable
prior to interaction, suggests a novel explanation of why different conventions can coexist:
they may act as signals allowing coordination across types. In other words, if it is known
that a specific way of speaking/dressing is adopted mainly by agents with a certain trait, an
individual might prefer to interact with the people showing that way of speaking/dressing
– even if this forces such individual to coordinate on an action that yields low payoffs –
because this allows him to interact with people that possess his own trait. Importantly, this
kind of intuition points to a joint explanation of the co-existence of different conventions
and the emergence of homogeneous clusters, at least for those situations where agents can
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choose with whom to interact.
Our contribution. We explore social coordination in a population made of two different
types that have a preference for own-type but can observe others’ type only after first inter-
action, and that interact on a network which they can shape but with a constraint on the
maximum number of neighbors.
More precisely, we consider a variant of the model in Staudigl and Weidenholzer (2014).
With respect to the latter, we introduce the novelty that agents are of two different types,
x and y, and that types are payoff relevant, in the sense that a penalty d > 0 is suffered
when interacting with a different type. Importantly, actions taken by agents are globally
observable, while types are not observable prior to interaction: each agent knows the type of
agents with whom he is connected, and ignores the type of other agents, being only able to
form expectations on the basis of the distribution of choices at the current population state.
Our main results concern the long-run prediction obtained by applying stochastic stability
(see Young, 1993, and Kandori et al., 1993), and are twofold. When d is low the payoff-
dominant convention is the only stochastically stable outcome: in the long run all agents of
both types end up choosing the payoff-dominant action. This result can be interpreted as a
robustness check of Staudigl and Weidenholzer (2014). When instead d is sufficiently high,
then the stochastically stable states are those where all agents of one type choose an action,
and all agents of the other type choose the other action. To our knowledge, we are the
first in the stream of literature on social coordination and stochastic stability to introduce
agents’ heterogeneity with local observability of types. As a result, we obtain that the risk-
dominant action and the payoff-dominant action coexist in the long run for a reason that
is substantially different from restrictions to agents’ mobility (see the paragraph on related
literature for a more articulated discussion). The intuition is the following. One single
mutation can be enough to escape from a state where an agent, once he has deleted all of his
links by mistake, would be confronted with the risk of interacting with a different type if he
chooses to reconnect to agents choosing his same action. Moreover, one single mutation is
enough provided that the penalty for interacting with a different type is sufficiently large. In
our model the former condition holds for all states where actions and types are not perfectly
correlated; instead, it never holds for the states where all agents of one type choose one
action and all agents of the other type choose the other action. Therefore, when d is large
the states where actions and types are perfectly correlated are harder to leave in terms of
mutations, which makes them stochastically stable.
We observe that a single mutation would not be sufficient to leave an absorbing state
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if the mutant is able to remember the agents with whom he was previously connected and
to re-establish a link with them. Indeed, in our model agents are prevented from tracing
back their previous mates. This can be interpreted as a lack of memory regarding past
interactions. However, what is actually needed for our results is that agents have decaying
memory, so that they will eventually forget the identity of previous mates. Coupled with
positive inertia, this would imply that, with positive probability, the mutant has forgotten
the identities of his previous interaction partners when he gets the opportunity to update
his strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next paragraph surveys the relevant
literature, contrasting our contribution with the existing ones. Section 2 introduces the basic
elements of the model. Section 3 discusses the induced Markov chain, and provides some
simple results for the unperturbed dynamics. Section 4 considers the perturbed dynamics
and gives the main results concerning stochastic stability. Section 5 concludes by discussing
the assumptions, and providing directions for future research. An appendix collects the
proofs of the propositions on the unperturbed dynamics and of all lemmas, while the proofs
of the propositions on the perturbed dynamics are given in the main text.
Related literature. Most papers on social coordination in the long run consider agents
who follow myopic best reply rules and occasionally make mistakes.1 The main message in
this literature is that, when the interaction structure is exogenous, inefficient risk-dominant
conventions emerge in the long run.2,3 However, when the interaction structure is endogenous
this result does not necessarily hold and the payoff-dominant action can be selected in the
long-run. The endogeneity of the interaction has been modeled mainly in two ways: (i) the
agents can choose with whom to form an interaction network, and (ii) the agents can select
a location among a number of locations available and then interact with agents in the same
location.
In approach (i), to which our model belongs, network formation is typically associated to
1See, e.g., Eshel et al. (1998), Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2008), Alós-Ferrer and Shi (2012) and Cui
(2014), and references therein, for models of local interaction where agents follow imitative behavior.
2For global interaction models see, e.g., Kandori et al. (1993), Kandori and Rob (1995), Young (1993).
For local interaction models see Blume (1993, 1995), Ellison (1993, 2000), Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer
(2007) and Jiang and Weidenholzer (2016); for a general framework for local interaction models with an
exogenous interaction structure see Peski (2010); finally, see Weidenholzer (2010) for a recent survey on local
interaction models focusing on social coordination.
3Neary (2012) studies a model of social coordination where the interaction structure is exogenous and
global, but agents are heterogeneous in their preferences about the action upon which to coordinate. In this
setup only payoff-efficient conventions are selected.
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a cost to maintain the existing links. In a non-cooperative setup, Goyal and Vega-Redondo
(2005) show that when interaction is unconstrained (i.e., there is no bound to the number of
agents one can form a link with) and costs to maintain a link are low, then the risk-dominant
convention still emerges in the long run, while for relatively high costs to maintain a link the
payoff-dominant convention does emerge.4,5 Our model follows the version of Goyal and Vega-
Redondo (2005) where both the cost to maintain a link and the payoff flow is asymmetric
(i.e., the agent who pays the cost is the only one to receive the payoff of interaction).6 With
respect to it, our model differs for three distinctive features: (1) agents have a maximum
number of interactions that can maintain at the same time, as in Staudigl and Weidenholzer
(2014), (2) agents come in two distinct types with a preference for interacting with agents
of their own type, and (3) an agent’s type can be observed only if already connected to him.
Indeed, the paper that is most related to ours is Staudigl and Weidenholzer (2014). They
show that, when interaction is constrained in the sense that agents can only support a small
number of links with respect to the population size, then the payoff-dominant convention
emerges in the long run. Our paper shows that this result is robust to the introduction of
features (2) and (3), provided that the preference for interacting with one’s own type is not
too strong; however, if the cost of interacting with agents of a different type is large enough,
then efficiency is lost and both conventions co-exist in the long run.
In approach (ii), the interaction structure is constrained by the fact that an agent can
interact only with those agents choosing the same location. Oechssler (1997), Ely (2002),
and Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2004) are all nice examples of models in which agents
play a coordination game and have to choose one location among the locations where the
coordination game is played. In these models, the payoff-dominant convention typically
emerges in the long run. In the light of our results, a case of particular interest is when
locations are subject to a capacity constraint, thus impeding or forcing the movements
of agents across them. The important fact here is that under this constraint the payoff-
dominant convention is no longer the only one selected in the long run and, in addition,
4Hojman and Szeidl (2006) develop a related model with uni-directional payoff flows that accrue from all
path-connected agents.
5Jackson and Watts (2002) study a cooperative (pairwise) network formation model and show that for
low costs to maintain a link the risk-dominant convention is selected, while for high costs both the payoff-
dominant and the risk-dominant conventions can be selected. The difference with Goyal and Vega-Redondo
(2005) is mainly due to the fact that the transition from one convention to the other is stepwise, while in
the non-cooperative setup it is all at once when a sufficient number of agents become mutants.
6In the main model of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005), instead, the payoff is earned by players on both
sides of the link, independently of who is paying to maintain the link.
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non-monomorphic states can be stochastically stable. More precisely, the co-existence of
both payoff-dominant and risk-dominant conventions can be obtained in the long run. In
this regard, Anwar (2002) studies a model where there are constraints on locations and
each location has a certain number of patriots (i.e., agents who never want to leave their
current location). The author shows that when the constraints on locations are tight (i.e.,
a small number of agents can/want to move) then the risk-dominant convention emerges
in the long run, while if sufficient movement is possible across locations (capacity is large
and/or patriots are few) then different conventions emerge at different locations. Further,
in the case where the size of location is asymmetric, the location with the smaller size will
have agents coordinating on the payoff-dominant convention.7
A similar model to that in Anwar (2002) is studied by Blume and Temzelides (2003),
who also draw the conclusion that restricted mobility may lead to the coexistence of different
conventions. In addition, the analysis of Blume and Temzelides (2003) allows to understand
more clearly which are the long-run effects of increased mobility on the adopted convention:
both a higher number of locations, and a higher fraction of agents that are mobile, have a
positive impact on the likelihood to observe the emergence of the payoff-dominant convention
at one location (with all mobile agents being at that location), as opposed to the risk-
dominant convention at every location. Furthermore, Blume and Temzelides (2003) study
the long-run payoffs of mobile and immobile agents as a function of the exogenous restrictions
on mobility: they find that mobile agents enjoy a higher payoff and always benefit from
increased mobility, while immobile agents benefit from increased mobility at low levels of
mobility only.
We stress that we obtain the co-existence of conventions without such constraints on
mobility. Instead, we rely on the cost of type mismatch (that requires some degree of
agents heterogeneity) and on the risk of mismatch (that requires some degree of imperfect
observability of types). We also stress that in our model, differently from Anwar (2002),
when the total population size is large, the relative size of the two populations of types does
not affect which population plays which convention, provided that the cost of mismatch is
large enough.8
7See Pin et al. (2016) for a generalization to the case of more than two locations.
8Another relevant contribution is Dieckmann (1999), although it is in a sense less related because agents
are supposed to follow imitation rules instead of myopic best reply rules. Dieckmann (1999) presents a
location model where, besides capacity constraints, the movement across locations is subject to frictions
(in the form of the possibility that only the action or only the location is revised as desired) and the play
outside the current location is imperfectly observable. The main finding – substantially in line with Anwar
(2002) and Blume and Temzelides (2003) – is that imperfect observability and frictions alone cannot block
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Finally, Carvalho (2016) shows that the co-existence of conventions can emerge also
under global random interaction, provided that the population is divided into cultural groups
that have distinct taboos (some actions are never played voluntarily) and different cultural
preferences (for the non-taboo actions). In our model too preferences are type-dependent,
although in a substantially different way: heterogeneity is not with regard to actions but
with regard to the cultural identity of the interacting partner.
2 The model
Network structure. We consider a set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of agents. Each i ∈ N can
choose the subset of other agents with whom to play a fixed bilateral social game. Formally,
let gi = (gi1, . . . , gin) be the n-dimensional vector collecting i’s connections; in particular,
gij ∈ {0, 1}, and we say that agent i maintains a link with agent j if gij = 1. We assume
that gii = 0 for every i ∈ N . Connections are directed, so that gij = 1 does not necessarily
imply gji = 1. The maximum number of links that an agent can maintain at any given time
is k ≥ 1, and the cost to maintain any single link is c. An agent i is said to be isolated if
gij = 0 for every j ∈ N . A profile of link formation choices, one for each agent in N , is
denoted by g = (g1, g2, ..., gn). We will refer to g as the network of interactions.
Social game. Agents play a 2× 2 symmetric game in strategic form with common action
set. Each agent plays only with the agents with whom he is directly connected.
The table below describes the payoffs associated to the bilateral social game. Payoffs are




where the following inequalities hold:
i. π(A,A) > π(B,A) and π(B,B) > π(A,B);
the emergence of the payoff-dominant convention, while restricted mobility does. In our model the imperfect
observability (of types) can prevent the emergence of the payoff-dominant convention.
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ii. π(A,A) < π(B,B);
iii. π(B,B) + π(B,A) < π(A,A) + π(A,B);
which imply that two coordination equilibria exist (by i.), B is the payoff-dominant action
(by ii.) and A is the risk-dominant action (by iii.). We note that π(B,A) < π(A,B). We
further assume that all payoffs are positive, i.e., π(B,A) > 0.
Each agent i ∈ N has to choose an action ai ∈ {A,B} which is played against the choice
of each j for which gij = 1. A profile of action choices, one for each agent in N , is denoted
by a = (a1, a2, ..., an).
Strategies. A strategy for agent i is si = (ai, gi), where ai ∈ {A,B} denotes the action
chosen by i, and gi ∈ {0, 1}n, with gii = 0 and
∑
j gij ≤ k, denotes the agents with whom
agent i is connected (see network structure and social game). A profile of strategies for the
whole population – to which we also refer as state – is s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn). We will write
s = (a, g), where a is the action profile of the entire population and g is the interaction
network.9
Agents’ types. There are two types of agents in the population, x types and y types. The
type of agent i ∈ N is denoted by wi ∈ {x, y}. With some abuse of notation, we use ¬wi
to denote the type other than wi. We also define the indicator function of type dissimilarity
δ : N2 → {0, 1} such that δ(i, j) = 1 if and only wi 6= wj, and δ(i, j) = 0 otherwise. The
number of agents of type x is denoted by nx, while the number of agents of type y is denoted
by ny = n − nx. Without loss of generality, we assume that nx ≥ ny. We also assume that
the number of agents of each type is large relative to the number of maximum connections
for each agent; in particular, ny ≥ 2k + 1.
If agent i is of type wi and interacts with agent j whose type is wj 6= wi, then i incurs a
cost of d > 0; if instead wj = wi, then no cost is incurred.
Time. Agents repeatedly interact over time, which is assumed to be discrete, and indexed
by the natural numbers, i.e., t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. The state of the system at time t is denoted
with st = (st1, s
t




i is the strategy adopted by agent i at time t.
9We note that in this setting the number of strategies available to an agent easily gets extremely large
when n and k are not so small. For more details, we refer the interested reader to Staudigl and Weidenholzer
(2014), where the same model of constrained network formation is presented and analyzed.
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Revision protocol. In each round, every agent has the opportunity to revise his strategy
with probability γ ∈ (0, 1). When an agent receives a revision opportunity, he selects with
positive probability any strategy that maximizes the interim utility, as formally provided in
a subsequent paragraph.10
Information. If agent i receives a revision opportunity at time t + 1 then, for any agent
j such that gtij = 1, agent i knows both a
t
j and wj, while for any agent h such that g
t
ih = 0,
agent i knows only ath. Also, agent i is informed of the summary statistics of the population
state at time t; in particular, he knows the number of x types and y types that are playing
action A, as well as those who are playing action B, at state st. We stress, hence, that
information about others’ type accrues to an agent at two levels: locally, the agent knows
the type of each of his neighbors, while, globally, he only knows the averages of x-type and
y-type agents who are choosing A and B.
On the whole, a revising agent i at time t+1 knows the pieces of information listed in the
following table, where we also introduce specific notation to make the following exposition
easier.
Notation Number of agents...
n(w, a|st) of type w who are choosing action a
ni1(s
t) with whom agent i maintains a link
ni0(s
t) with whom agent i does not maintain a link
ni1(a|st) playing action a with whom agent i maintains a link
ni0(a|st) playing action a with whom agent i does not maintain a link
ni1(w|st) of type w with whom agent i maintains a link
ni0(w|st) of type w with whom agent i does not maintain a link
ni1(w, a|st) of type w playing action a with whom agent i maintains a link
ni0(w, a|st) of type w playing action a with whom agent i does not maintain a link
10We are aware that the details of the revision protocol may have important consequences, especially for
the selection results obtained by stochastic stability. Alós-Ferrer and Netzer (2010), for instance, obtain
that the result that stochastic stability under the logit dynamics of Blume (1993, 1997) selects potential
maximizers in exact potential games depends crucially on the assumption of asynchronous learning, i.e., one
and only one agent can revise strategy at each time. A recent strengthening of the notion of stochastic
stability which is robust to the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions can be
found in Alós-Ferrer and Netzer (2015).
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Utilities. The interim utility of agent i who chooses strategy si at time t + 1, when the







(π(at+1i , atj)− c) gt+1ij︸ ︷︷ ︸
payoff of social game
− d gtijgt+1ij δ(i, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸




gt+1ij (1− gtij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected cost of type mismatch if new
 .
The first term of ui(s
t+1
i , s
t) is the payoff from the social game net of the link maintenance
cost, and it is made by the sum of payoffs accruing to i from the links he chooses to maintain
at time t+ 1. The second term is the cost of maintaining links at time t+ 1 with agents of
a type different from wi and with whom i was already maintaining a link at time t; we note
that such a cost of type mismatch is known to i, since those agents are already his neighbors
and hence he knows their type. The third term is the expected cost due to the formation of
new links; differently from the previous term, these agents are new neighbors, and as such
their type is unknown to i, who can only compute the expected cost of type mismatch on
the basis of the fraction of agents of type different from wi (i.e., ¬wi) among the agents with
whom i is not connected and who choose the observed action.11
Once the decision is taken and the types of agents with whom new links are formed











total payoff of social game
− dni1(¬wi|st+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total cost of type mismatch
.
The first term of vi(s
t+1
i ) is, again, the payoff from the social game net of the link maintenance
cost, while the second term is the cost of maintaining links with agents of a type different
from wi, independently of whether i already had links towards them or not.
3 Unperturbed dynamics
Markov chain. The process described in Section 2 formally defines a Markov chain (S, P ),
where S is the state space (i.e., the set containing all possible states) and P is the transition
matrix, with Pss′ denoting the probability to move directly from state s to state s
′, with
s, s′ ∈ S.
11We note that the number of agents with whom i is not connected is computed at time t, so that i’s
choice to sever links at time t + 1 does not affect these numbers.
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Neighborhood heterogeneity. We start by providing two results on the short run be-
havior of the system.
Proposition 1. If agent i is given a revision opportunity at time t + 1, and there exists
j ∈ N such that gtij = 1, δ(i, j) = 1, and n(wi, atj|st) ≥ k + 1, then gt+1ij = 0 with probability
1.
Proposition 1 states that a revising agent, say i, maintaining a link towards an agent of a
different type, say j, will choose for sure to replace such a link with a new link towards an
agent h choosing the same action as j, provided that at least some agent exists who chooses
the same action as j and has the same type of i: indeed, h cannot grant a lower payoff than
j, and grants a higher payoff with positive probability.
Proposition 2. If at time t there exist i, j ∈ N such that gtij = 1, δ(i, j) = 0 and ati 6= atj,






i)− π(ati, atj), then gt+1ij = 1 with probability 1.
Proposition 2 states that a link between agents of the same type who play different actions
can be stable, at least in the short run. Indeed, an agent, say i, will keep maintaining a link
with another agent, say j, that plays a different action if the act of replacing j with some
other agent h who plays i’s action implies a severe risk of type mismatch, i.e., if the penalty
d is large enough and if the pool of potential new neighbors playing i’s action has a high
enough fraction of agents who are not of i’s type.
The above two results can be understood intuitively as follows. A revising agent can
condition his decision to form a link on the action of the new neighbor, but not on his type.
As a consequence of this, a link with an agent choosing the same action has no value: such
link can always be replaced by another link with an agent choosing the same action. Instead,
a link with an agent of the same type has a value: if such link is replaced by a new link then
the risk of a mismatch of types is sustained.
Absorbing sets. An absorbing set (otherwise called a recurrent class) is a minimal set of
states with respect to the property that the system has probability zero of moving from any
state in the set to any state out of the set.
We introduce a number of definitions that will be useful in the subsequent analysis, where
we discuss the variety of possible absorbing sets. Consider a state s = (a, g). State s is k-
regular if ni = k for every i ∈ N . State s is type-segregated if gij = 1 implies that δ(i, j) = 0.
We say that state s is monomorphic if ai = aj for all i, j ∈ N . In particular, we distinguish
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between states that are A-monomorphic and states that are B-monomorphic, i.e., states
where all agents choose A and states where all agents choose B, respectively. States that
are not monomorphic are called polymorphic. Among polymorphic states, an important role
in our analysis is played by type-monomorphic states; a state is called type-monomorphic
if ai = aj for all i, j such that wi = wj = w ∈ {x, y}, and it is not monomorphic. We
sometimes refer to states that are type-monomorphic with x on A and y on B (which means
that all agents of type x play A and all agents of type y play B), and states that are
type-monomorphic with x on B and y on A (with an analogous definition). All remaining
polymorphic states are called type-polymorphic. Finally, we denote with SAA the union of all
absorbing sets that contain only A-monomorphic states. We define SBB analogously. We use
SAB to denote the union of absorbing sets that contain only type-monomorphic states with
x on A and y on B; the set SBA is defined analogously, with the general rule that the apix
refers to the choice of agents of type x and the pedix refers to the choice of agents of type y.
Proposition 3.
(a) If c < π(A,A), then (i) there exist absorbing sets containing A-monomorphic states,
and (ii) there exist absorbing sets containing B-monomorphic states.
(b) If c < π(A,A) and d > π(B,B)−π(A,A), then (i) there exist absorbing sets containing
type-monomorphic states with x on A and y on B, and (ii) there exist absorbing sets
containing type-monomorphic states with x on B and y on A.
(c) If c < π(A,A) and d > 2[π(B,B)−π(A,A)], then there exist absorbing sets containing
type-polymorphic states.
(d) If c < π(A,A) and d > π(B,B)(n − 1)/nx, then there exist absorbing sets containing
states where some agent is isolated.
Proposition 3 allows us to make a remark about the effect that the introduction of a
payoff relevant heterogeneity in types has on the possibility to observe the coexistence of
both actions in the long run.12 If all agents had the same type, or if in our model we set
d = 0 so that types are payoff irrelevant, essentially we would obtain the model of Staudigl
and Weidenholzer (2014), where the only absorbing sets (provided that c is not too large)
are those in which all agents choose the same action. This can be easily understood by
12We stress that the conditions provided are only sufficient. Since this result does not play an important
role for the following investigation of stochastic stability, we have chosen not to give tighter conditions, which
would have required a more cumbersome analysis.
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noting that, in such a case, if it is optimal for an agent to maintain his current action, then
it is optimal for agents using a different action to switch to this one. By introducing agents
of different types, and unobservability of types prior to linking, we obtain that agents at
different locations in the network are different because they have different local information
about the types of their neighbors. Such information is valuable if types are payoff relevant,
i.e., when d > 0. This leads to a substantially richer variety of states belonging to absorbing
sets. Monomorphic states still belong to absorbing sets (point (a)). In addition to them,
when d is sufficiently large we find absorbing sets containing polymorphic states. In particular
we have that both type-monomorphic states and type-polymorphic states can belong to
absorbing sets (points (b) and (c), respectively). This leads to the following observation:
even if interactions between agents of different types are unlikely to last for a long time (see
Proposition 1), so that the two populations of agents may apparently live totally independent
lives, they in fact influence each other in an indirect way. Finally, we have that, when d is
large enough, there are absorbing sets containing states where some agent is isolated, even
if c is not very large (point (d)). More importantly, as it will become clearer in the following
examples, there is the possibility that some agents are isolated and others are not. We stress
that this heterogeneity in the network structure can not be observed if isolation is obtained
by raising c.
Graphical illustrations. In Fig. 1–4 we provide some graphical representations with the
aim of illustrating the variety of possible absorbing sets. In all the examples, we have
nx = 10, ny = 9, k = 3. Circles identify x types, squares identify y types. Arrows represent
interactions. Agents choosing action A are colored in light green, agents choosing B are
colored in dark blue.
Fig. 1 depicts monomorphic states; more precisely, in Subfig. 1a we have anA-monomorphic
state, and in Subfig. 1b we have a B-monomorphic state. Also, the subfigures represent states
that are k-regular, since every agent has exactly 3 connections (in particular, the same con-
nections are in place in the two states). Consistent with point (a) of Proposition 3, such
states belong to absorbing sets for any value of d. In particular, each state belongs to a
singleton absorbing set: as long as d is positive, every agent prefers not to reshuffle his links,
in order to avoid the risk of a type mismatch.
Fig. 2 depicts type-monomorphic states; more precisely, in Subfig. 2a we have a type-
monomorphic state with x on A and y on B, and in Subfig. 2b we have a type-monomorphic
state with x on B and y on A. Both states are k-regular; this must necessarily be the case,
since there is no risk of mismatch due to the perfect correlation between actions and types.
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(a) An A-monomorphic state. (b) A B-monomorphic state.
Figure 1: Examples of monomorphic states.
(a) A type-monomorphic state with x on A
and y on B.
(b) A type-monomorphic state with x on B
and y on A.
Figure 2: Examples of type-monomorphic states.
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We observe that each of these states belongs to an absorbing set comprising many states; this
is so because agents are indifferent between keeping current mates and substituting them
with other agents choosing the same action. In order for type-monomorphic states to belong
to an absorbing set, we must have that agents choosing A do not find it profitable to switch
to B and cast links to agents choosing B; this happens when d > π(B,B)− π(A,A), which
is the same inequality given in point (b) of Proposition 3.
Figure 3: A type-polymorphic state.
Fig. 3 represents a state that is type-polymorphic. In particular, there are agents of each
type choosing A, and agents of the same type choosing B. It is easy to understand that,
given the current network of interactions, no agent wants to change action. Also, agents
who choose B will never reshuffle links, because there is a risk of type mismatch if doing
so, while there is no benefit. Agents who choose A face an expected penalty due to type
mismatch that is equal to d/2; if such a cost is larger than π(B,B) − π(A,A), which is
the same inequality given in point (c) of Proposition 3, then these agents will never change
strategy as well, so that the state in Fig. 3 actually belongs to a singleton absorbing set.
We stress that, even if the state under consideration is k-regular, there are type-polymorphic
states belonging to absorbing sets where this is not the case (the same can occur for monomor-
phic states, while type-monomorphic states are necessarily k-regular). Imagine that, starting
from the state represented in Fig. 3, a link is removed. Intuitively, if d is large enough, then
the expected penalty of a type mismatch is sufficiently large to discourage any attempt to
form a new link. Finally, a link between two agents of the same type who choose different
actions might also be in place, in case such an interaction brings a positive payoff (which
happens if c is not that large), and d is again sufficiently large (see Proposition 2).
Fig. 4 depicts a state where one agent is isolated. In particular, agent i has no link
outgoing from him. Furthermore, agent i plays action A, while all other agents (including
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i
Figure 4: A state where an agent is isolated.
those having the same type as i) play B, so the state represented is type-polymorphic. If the
expected penalty for i of a new link towards an agent playing B (which is equal to 10d/18) is
larger than the largest benefit coming from the new interaction (which is equal to π(B,B))
then casting a new link is unprofitable. We observe that the arising inequality is the same
as the inequality in point (d) of Proposition 3, once we consider that nx = 10 and ny = 9.
We also observe that agent i will keep on switching from action B to A and vice versa, since
both actions grant him the same (null) utility. Moreover, all other agents strictly prefer
not to change their strategies, since they currently earn the maximum attainable utility
and reshuffling links comes with the risk of a type mismatch. Therefore, the state in Fig. 4
actually belongs to an absorbing set. We finally notice that agent i has no incoming links. We
remark that this is something specific to this example; indeed, there exist states belonging
to absorbing sets where an agent exists who has some incoming links and no outgoing links
(so that such an agent is still isolated).
4 Perturbed dynamics
Regular perturbed Markov chain. We are ready to introduce perturbations in the
unperturbed dynamics considered in Section 3, and to apply concepts and tools developed
by Foster and Young (1990), Young (1993), Kandori et al. (1993) and Ellison (2000).
We adopt the so-called uniform error model for mistakes.13 In particular, when an agent
13It is well known that the way in which perturbations are modeled has, in general, important consequences
on the outcome of the perturbed dynamics (see Bergin and Lipman, 1996). While the uniform error model
is a specific way among many possibilities, we stress that it is very common in the literature (starting
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is given a revision opportunity, with probability 1−ε he will update his strategy by using the
myopic best-reply rule described in the previous section, while with probability ε the agent
is hit by a perturbation (or mutation, mistake, etc.,) and chooses at random one strategy in
his strategy set. The arising transition matrix is denoted with P ε, and we refer to (S, P ε)
as the perturbed Markov chain resulting from (S, P ). For any positive level of ε, the system
can move with positive probability from any state to any other state, i.e., it is ergodic. This
implies that the perturbed Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic and hence, by known
results, there exists a unique invariant distribution µε over states in S that describes the long-
run behavior of the system. As ε tends to zero, we have that P ε tends to P ; in particular,
P εss′ ∼ εr(s,s
′) as ε→ 0, where r(s, s′) is the so-called resistance of the transition from s to s′,
which basically counts how many perturbations (or mutations, mistakes, etc.,) are required
to complete such a transition in one period of time. A family of perturbed Markov chains
for ε going to zero which satisfies the above properties is called a regular perturbed Markov
chain. For a regular perturbed Markov chain, the limit of the invariant distribution µε for
ε going to zero is known to exist, and the states having positive probability in that limiting
distribution are called stochastically stable. The following characterization of stochastically
stable states will be useful for our subsequent analysis (see Young, 2001, for a more detailed
exposition).
The notion of resistance can be extended by relaxing the constraint that the transition
must occur in one period, and can be usefully applied to absorbing sets instead of states.
Given two absorbing sets S ′ and S ′′, the resistance between S ′ and S ′′ is given by the
minimum sum of resistances between states over paths that start in a state belonging to
S ′ and end in a state belonging to S ′′. Now, for any conceivable tree (i.e., a graph such
that any two vertices are connected by exactly one path) having the absorbing set S ′ as
root and all absorbing sets as nodes, consider the sum of resistances assigned to each edge
of the tree, and take the minimum over trees of such a sum. This number represents the
stochastic potential of S ′. Intuitively, the stochastic potential tells us how difficult is to reach
an absorbing set starting from other absorbing sets. A fundamental result in this literature
asserts that a state is stochastically stable if and only if it belongs to an absorbing set with
minimum potential: stochastically stable states are those that are relatively easiest to reach
in terms of the minimum number of mutations required to reach such states starting from
other states.
Two other notions are useful in the following analysis: the radius and coradius (Ellison,
from Young, 1993 and Kandori et al., 1993), despite the fact that recent experimental evidence points to
alternative error models (Mäs and Nax, 2016; Lim and Neary, 2016).
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2000). If Q is a union of absorbing sets, consider all possible paths – i.e., sequences of states
– starting from a state in Q and ending in a state belonging to an absorbing set that is
not part of Q. The radius of Q, denoted with R(Q), is defined as the minimum sum of
resistances between states over all such paths. Now consider all possible paths starting from
a state belonging to an absorbing set Q′ and ending in a state in Q. For each Q′, consider the
minimum sum of resistances between states over all such paths. The coradius of Q, denoted
with CR(Q), is the maximum among Q′ of such minimum numbers. Intuitively, R(Q) and
CR(Q) provide measures of how difficult it is, respectively, to leave Q and to reach Q.
Stochastic stability: low cost of mismatch in types. Our first main result on stochas-
tic stability is Proposition 4, and it addresses the case where the cost of interacting with an
agent of a different type is low relative to the gain of coordinating on the payoff-dominant
action instead of the risk-dominant one. Preliminarily, Lemma 1 provides a characterization
of the set SBB that is then exploited in the proof of the proposition.
Lemma 1 (Characterization of SBB ). If c < π(A,A), d < π(B,B) − π(A,A), then a state
s ∈ SBB if and only if (i) s is B-monomorphic, (ii) s is k-regular, and (iii) s is type-segregated.
Moreover, every s ∈ SBB belongs to a singleton absorbing set.
Lemma 1 states that SBB is made of the union of all and only the singleton absorbing sets
where each agent plays B and has k links towards agents of his own type.
Proposition 4. If c < π(A,A), d < π(B,B) − π(A,A), then a state s is stochastically
stable if and only if s ∈ SBB .
Proof. We remind that SBB is defined as a union of absorbing sets. We then compute its
radius and coradius, denoted with R(SBB ) and CR(S
B
B ), respectively. We first observe that
in every state where at least k+ 1 agents choose B, then all agents find it optimal to choose
B and have k connections to agents choosing B: indeed, such a strategy grants in the worst
case of all mismatches a payoff of k(π(B,B)− c−d), while the highest payoff with any other
strategy is k(π(A,A) − c), which is lower by the assumption d < π(B,B) − π(A,A). So,
starting from a state in SBB , at least n− k mutations must occur to switch n− k agents from
B to A, hence leaving less than k + 1 agents choosing B. Our assumptions guarantee that
n ≥ 4k + 2. This implies that R(SBB ) ≥ 3k + 2.
We now suppose to start from a state outside SBB . With k mutations, we are sure to reach
a state where at least k agents choose B. In such a state, all other agents find it optimal
to choose B and connect to agents choosing B (for the same reasons discussed above).
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This means that a state in SBB can be reached with positive probability in the unperturbed
dynamics, thus implying that CR(SBB ) ≤ k. Since R(SBB ) > CR(SBB ), we can conclude by
Theorem 1 of Ellison (2000) that all stochastically stable states belong to SBB .
The last step is to show that, for any two states s = (a, g), s′ = (a′, g′) ∈ SBB , there exists
a sequence of states belonging to absorbing sets s1, . . . , si, . . . , s` such that s1 = s, s` = s
′,
and a single mutation is sufficient to move from si to si+1 for i = 1, . . . , `− 1. If, for agent i,
we have that si 6= s′i, then a single mutation can change si to s′i. The state reached in this
way forms an absorbing set by Lemma 1, since all agents play B, it is k-regular and type-
segregated. With at most n of such steps, we are sure to have reached state s′. Therefore,
SBB is a mutation-connected component (in the words of Samuelson, 1994), and we apply
Theorem 2 in that paper to conclude that all states in SBB are stochastically stable.
Let us make a remark to better constrast our results with those in Staudigl and Weiden-
holzer (2014). In our model, the assumption that nx ≥ ny ≥ 2k+1 implies that k < (n−1)/2.
In the model of Staudigl and Weidenholzer (2014) (see Theorem 1) this condition guarantees
that the payoff-dominant convention is the stochastically stable outcome. In this respect,
our Proposition 4 represents a robustness check of their result: the introduction of types
that are not globally observable and that determine a penalty in case of a mismatch does
not affect the long-run prediction in favor of the payoff-dominant convention, provided that
the penalty for a mismatch in types is sufficiently low. The only difference between our
prediction and theirs concerns the shape of the interaction network: we obtain that stochas-
tically stable states are type-segregated, while this feature is clearly absent in Staudigl and
Weidenholzer (2014). This is something expected – especially in monomorphic states – as
the interaction between agents of different types bears a cost.
Stochastic stability: high cost of mismatch in types. The prediction obtained by
stochastic stability drastically changes when d is high. Surprisingly, neither the payoff-
dominant convention nor the risk-dominant convention is selected in this case. Rather, we
obtain that both actions will co-exist in the long run.
The proof of the result relies on a tree surgery argument, exploiting the techniques by
Young (1993). Basically, we will show that, starting from any absorbing set that is not
included in SAB ∪ SBA , we can build sequences of absorbing sets ending in SAB and SBA such
that each step has resistance 1. Then, we show that the radius of SAB and the radius of S
B
A
are larger than 1, which implies that all other absorbing sets have a stochastic potential that
is higher than SAB and S
B
A . The proof of Proposition 5, where our main result is provided,
makes use of the preliminary results stated in Lemmas from 2 to 6.
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We start by providing a characterization of SAB and S
B
A . In particular, Lemma 2 states
that SAB and S
B
A are two absorbing sets, each made of all and only the states where all agents
of one type play an action, all agents of the other type play the other action, and every agent
has k links towards agents of his own type.
Lemma 2 (Characterization of SAB and S
B




(a) a state s ∈ SAB if and only if (i) s is type-monomorphic with x on A and y on B, (ii)
s is k-regular, and (iii) s is type-segregated;
(b) a state s ∈ SBA if and only if (i) s is type-monomorphic with x on B and y on A, (ii)
s is k-regular, and (iii) s is type-segregated.
Moreover, SAB and S
B
A are two absorbing sets.
With the following lemma we establish that at least 2 mutations are required to leave SAB (or
SAB) reaching, with positive probability, another absorbing set. Moreover, we establish that
if the population of agents of each type is sufficiently large, then the number of mutations to
leave SAB is equal to the number of mutations to leave S
B
A . We draw attention to note that
the result holds when k ≥ 2,14 and this limits the applicability of Proposition 5 as well.
Lemma 3 (Away from SAB and S
B
A ). If c < π(A,A), d > π(B,B)
n− 1
ny
, and k ≥ 2, then




then R(SAB) = R(S
B
A ).
By Lemma 4 we establish that, starting from any state in an absorbing set, there exists a
sequence of absorbing sets that reaches an absorbing set belonging to SAA ∪ SBB ∪ SAB ∪ SBA ,
with each step in the sequence requiring a single mutation.
Lemma 4 (Towards SAA∪SBB ∪SBA ∪SAB). If Q is an absorbing set, then there exists a sequence
of absorbing sets Q1, . . . , Q`, where Q1 = Q and Q` ⊆ SAA ∪SBB ∪SAB ∪SBA , such that a single
mutation is sufficient to move from Qi to Qi+1 for i = 1, . . . , `− 1.
14We are indebted to an anonymous referee who has provided a simple example where k = 1 and a single
mutation is sufficient to leave SAB and S
B
A : think of all agents of one type as located around a circle, with
each agent who is linked only to the agent on his right; they are all playing A, and a mutation hits an agent
so that his action changes from A to B while his neighbor remains the same; now, the agent on his left, if
given the possibility, would switch from A to B; after that, also the agent on the left of the latter agent
would like to switch from A to B, and so on; this clockwise path of adjustments, which occurs with positive
probability, ends in a state belonging to SBB .
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B with a minimum number of
mutations; in particular, it shows the existence of a sequence of absorbing sets that, starting
from SAB (respectively, S
B




A )) mutations to do the first
step, and then proceeds with all steps requiring a single mutation until an absorbing set in
SBB is reached.
Lemma 5 (From SAB to S
B




B ). If Q = S
A
B or Q = S
B
A and Q
′ ⊆ SBB are
absorbing sets, then:
(a) there exists a sequence of absorbing sets Q1, . . . , Q`, where Q1 = Q and Q` = Q
′, such
that R(SAB) mutations are required to move from Q1 to Q2, and a single mutation is
sufficient to move from Qi to Qi+1 for i = 2, . . . , `− 1;





′ and Q′` = Q,




2, and a single mutation
is sufficient to move from Q′i to Q
′
i+1 for i = 2, . . . , `− 1.
Finally, the following lemma provides the last result to be used in the proof of Proposition 5:
for any absorbing set belonging to SAA ∪ SBB , we can find a sequence of absorbing sets where
each step of the sequence has resistance 1, which originates from the absorbing set under
consideration and reaches SAB (or S
B
A ).
Lemma 6 (From SAA ∪ SBB to SBA and to SAB). If Q ⊆ SAA ∪ SBB and Q′ = SBA or Q′ = SAB are
absorbing sets, then there exists a sequence of absorbing sets Q1, . . . , Q`, where Q1 = Q and
Q` = Q
′, such that a single mutation is sufficient to move from Qi to Qi+1 for i = i, . . . , `−1.
We are now ready to state and to prove our main result.
Proposition 5. If c < π(A,A), d > π(B,B)
n− 1
ny
, and k ≥ 2, then every stochastically sta-




then a state s is stochastically stable if and only if s ∈ SBA ∪ SAB .
Proof. By Lemma 2 we know that SAB and S
B
A are two absorbing sets, and by nesting Lemma
4 with Lemma 5 and with Lemma 6 we can find, starting from any absorbing set, a path
between absorbing sets that leads to SAB and such that every step in the path involves only
1 mutation, except if the path goes through SBA , which instead requires R(S
B
A ) mutations
to leave. For every absorbing set, take one such path with the absorbing set as the starting
point, and consider the arising directed graph; for every absorbing set that has more than
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one out-going link, all such links but one are deleted; by doing so, we are able to construct
an SAB-tree over absorbing sets where every link between any two nodes involves only 1
mutation, except for the link out-going from SBA , which involves R(S
B
A ) mutations.
We observe that 1 is the minimum number of mutations required to move between ab-
sorbing sets, and R(SBA ) is the minimum number of mutations required to exit S
B
A , by Lemma
3. Therefore, the stochastic potential of SAB is equal to ξ − 2 + R(SBA ), where ξ denotes the
total number of absorbing sets. With an analogous reasoning we obtain that the stochastic
potential of SBA is equal to ξ − 2 +R(SAB).
Now we consider an absorbing set Q 6⊆ SAB ∪ SBA . We observe again that 1 is the mini-
mum number of mutations required to move between absorbing sets, R(SBA ) is the minimum
number of mutations required to exit SBA , and R(S
A
B) is the minimum number of muta-
tions required to exit SAB . Therefore, the stochastic potential of Q cannot be lower than
ξ−3+R(SAB)+R(SBA ), which is higher than the stochastic potentials of SAB and SBA , because
R(SAB) ≥ 2 and R(SBA ) ≥ 2 by Lemma 3. This allows us to conclude, by Theorem 2 in Young




is satisfied, then the stochastic potentials of SAB and S
B
A
are equal, and hence we can conclude, again by Theorem 2 in Young (1993), that a state s
is stochastically stable state if and only if s ∈ SBA ∪ SAB .
The results stated in Proposition 5 can be better understood if contrasted with the results
provided in Anwar (2002) and Blume and Temzelides (2003). As mentioned in the Introduc-
tion, Anwar (2002) and Blume and Temzelides (2003) study models where agents interact at
specific locations in the presence of restrictions to mobility; the main finding is that the risk-
dominant and the payoff-dominant convention can co-exist in the long run, provided that
there is enough freedom of mobility across locations. However, freedom of mobility must
not be too much – i.e., some agents are not allowed to go to the location that they prefer
– otherwise only the payoff-dominant convention emerges – as shown by, e.g., Bhaskar and
Vega-Redondo (2004). So, co-existence can be understood as the result of imperfections – or
frictions – that makes this case lie in between absence of mobility – when the risk-dominant
convention emerges in the log-run – and full mobility – when the payoff-dominant convention
does emerge.
On the contrary, in the present model the co-existence of distinct conventions is the
consequence of a new effect that favors directly type-monomorphic states, rather than me-
diating between two extreme cases where the two conventions are globally adopted. Type-
monomorphic states are indeed the only states where the information on types can be per-
22
fectly derived from the observation of actions, allowing a mutant to come back with certainty
to having interactions with agents of own type; this makes type-monomorphic states rela-
tively more resilient to mutations.
5 Discussion
Network formation model. The non-cooperative model of network formation that we
have considered is non-cooperative and asymmetric in both cost bearing and payoff flows
(fundamentally, the one-way flow model in Bala and Goyal, 2000). The assumption that
connections are formed unilaterally can be realistic for some cases, while for other cases a
cooperative model of network formation might be more appropriate – like that in Jackson and
Watts (2002), where the consent of both agents involved is needed to form a link. Further,
the assumption that payoffs flow unilaterally to the agent who has established the link – and
bears the maintenance cost – is another feature of our model that may fit some cases, but not
others. Both assumptions are also found in Staudigl and Weidenholzer (2014), which is the
natural benchmark against which to compare our results. In their analysis, as in ours, the
two assumptions described above allow a reasonable treatment of the model that, otherwise,
would have been by far more complicated – and this, admittedly, is the main reason why we
adopt them.
However, we do want to stress that the main intuition underlying our results does not
depend crucially on the details of the network formation model. Indeed, it is a general
observation that, when types are not observable outside one’s own neighborhood and in-
teractions with different types are costly, there emerges an implicit cost of adding a new
neighbor. This is due to the risk of linking to an agent of a type different from one’s own;
and such a cost can be large enough to prevent an agent – who has been hit by a muta-
tion – from going back to his status quo. This allows paths made of single mutations to
move the system from one absorbing set to another absorbing set, making it rather easy
to exit most absorbing sets – including the ones with the payoff-dominant convention and
the risk-dominant convention. Similarly, we observe that there is only one situation where
such a risk is totally absent: when there is perfect correlation between actions and types,
i.e., in type-monomorphic states; indeed, if we start from a type-monomorphic state then
going back to the status quo after a single mutation comes at no implicit cost and, hence,
it is quite more difficult to leave a type-monomorphic state. This is the core reason why
the absorbing sets collecting type-monomorphic states are stochastically stable, and in this
argument there is no substantial role played by a specific network formation model (even if
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details can well and substantially affect transition periods and patterns).
Type unobservability and homophily. The ingredients which are crucial in the above
reasoning are related to two distinct aspects: the unobservability of the types of agents with
whom no link is currently maintained, and the magnitude of the cost that has to be incurred
to interact with an agent of a different type. The fact that types are unobservable prior to
interaction seems a plausible assumption in many situations, at least if we think of the type
as private piece of information which is learned only after interaction – possibly inferring the
type from the payoff earned (which seems natural if type is a payoff relevant characteristic).15
The cost to be incurred for type mismatch can be seen as a form of homophily, i.e., as the
result of preferences for interacting with one’s own type. In this regard, we observe that our
model exhibits homophily in the long run, and this is less obvious than it might appear at first
because agents cannot choose directly to interact with agents of similar type – exactly because
types are not observable prior to interaction. In this sense, the present paper can be seen
as a marginal contribution to the recent literature on homophily in social interactions (see
Currarini et al., 2009 and Bramoullé et al., 2012): social coordination plus weak homophily
(i.e., d is small enough) leads to the global adoption of the payoff-dominant convention (like
in Staudigl and Weidenholzer, 2014) with the additional feature that interactions take place
only between agents of the same type (see Proposition 4 and comments thereafter), while if
homophily is strong enough (i.e., d is large enough) in the long-run we observe segregation in
both types and actions (see Proposition 5). As a final remark on the cost of type mismatch,
we observe that such cost can well be interpreted as a part of the link maintenance cost.
With this interpretation, while a connection with a agent of similar type has a cost of c,
a connection with an agent of different type has a cost of c + d, where d measures some
additional type-related cost of interaction (e.g., extra communication costs due to the use of
a different language).
Lack of memory. There is another assumption of our model that is crucial for our results,
as anticipated in the Introduction: the agents’ lack of memory. The important consequence
of the lack of memory is that agents who are hit by a mutation, and change the network of
interactions, cannot choose to go back and connect with the same agents with whom they
15We observe that our main results could be extended with few adjustments to a model where agents also
observe the types of those they are passively linked with; intuitively, our arguments in the proofs remain
substantially valid provided that, when constructing outgoing paths from absorbing sets, we make sure that
the mutants do not have any incoming links, which can be obtained easily (at most with sequences where
each step requires a single mutation) since populations have been assumed large enough (i.e., k < (ny−1)/2).
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were previously connected. In fact, if this were possible, there would be no risk of type
mismatch when an agent is hit by a mutation and considers to go back to his previous status
quo – i.e., to undo what a mutation has done. So, without this assumption our results would
not be warranted. However, we think that assuming agents’ lack of memory does fit some
relevant cases. For instance, it fits the case where the effects of a mutation persist over several
periods and the mutants can receive the opportunity to readjust their strategy only after some
time, but in the meanwhile old neighbors might have become untraceable or unrecognizable.
In general, we can think of the lack of memory as not only due to agents’ cognitive bounds,
but also to the actual technology of interactions which might make it impossible to retain
with certainty the access to old neighbors (for instance, this is something quite widespread
in social interactions over the internet). Most importantly, as stressed in the Introduction,
what is really required for our main results is a weak version of the lack of memory, i.e.,
a positive probability that agents are not able to trace back their old neighbors once they
disconnect from them.16
Extensions. We end this discussion with a couple of remarks concerning the coordination
game. First, we observe that the mechanism behind our results does not rest crucially on
the fact that one action is payoff-dominant and the other action is risk-dominant. What is
important in order to establish that absorbing sets made of type-monomorphic states are
more resilient to mutations – i.e., that at least two mutations are required to leave these
absorbing set (see Lemma 3) – is that, once a mutation has turned a single agent from A
to B, the agents who are connected to him must not find it profitable to switch from A to
B. In our model this condition is implied by the fact that A is risk-dominant (we remind
also that in SAB and S
B
A all agents are k-regular with agents of their own type). However, if
action B were both payoff-dominant and risk-dominant, and provided that at least 2 out of
k neighbors must play B to have that playing B is better than playing A, then stochastic
stability would still select, under the assumptions of Proposition 5, states where agents of
one type coordinate on B, and agents of the other type coordinate on A.
Moreover, the inspection of the mechanism driving our results makes us confident that
similar conclusions hold in more general coordination games, and with more than 2 types of
agents. Our belief is that in any coordination game with a number of actions greater than
or equal to the number of types, if the cost of interacting with any type different from one’s
own is large enough, then different types will coordinate on different actions. Indeed, states
16This is reminiscent of the results found by Horvath et al. (2012) for the case of prisoner dilemma played
on a network, where a too long memory could disrupt superior equilibria.
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where at least one action is played by agents of two different types admit paths leading to
new absorbing sets which are made of steps involving a single mutation, on the ground of
the same intuition used in this paper: going back to the status quo after a mutation involves
the risk of a type mismatch for such agents. But this does not hold in states where types
and actions are perfectly correlated, and hence such states are more resilient to mutations;
of course, the existence of states where types and actions are perfectly correlated requires
that the existence of at least as many actions as types.
Another dimension along which our results could be extended concerns the error model,
even if a more careful analysis is required because not all mutations receive the same weight
once we abandon the uniform error model.17
We think that these observations reinforce the main message that can be drawn from
our contribution: in a setting where a population of agents has to form interactions and
coordinate on some action, if agents differ for some unobservable characteristic and inter-
actions between agents with dissimilar characteristics are costly enough, then actions will
end up playing the role of signals, allowing the formation of clusters of agents who are
type-homogeneous, each cluster coordinating on a different action.
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Appendix - Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose that agent i is given a revision opportunity at time t + 1, and suppose ad
absurdum that there exists a strategy si = (ai, gi) that maximizes the interim utility of i





i) such that a
′
i = ai and g
′
i is equal to gi with the only difference that in g
′
i the link
with agent j is removed and a new link is formed with an agent ` such that at` = a
t
j. We
observe that the assumption that n(wi, a
t
j|st) ≥ k + 1 implies that there exists at least an
agent having the same type as i and choosing the same action as j. This in turn implies (i)
that a new link can actually be formed with an agent ` choosing at` = a
t
j, and (ii) that the
overall change in utility for i by playing s′i instead of si is strictly positive: this is so because
the change of utility due to the play of the social game with all neighbors is trivially equal
to zero (since at` = a
t
j and all other neighbors have remained the same, while the change in
the expected number of different types is negative (since there is a positive probability that
` has the same type as i, and agent j is known for sure to be of different type).
We have proven that ui(s
′
i, s
t) > ui(si, s
t), and this suffices to show that agent i cannot
choose a strategy such that gt+1ij = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let us suppose, ad absurdum, that strategy si = (ai, gi) such that gij = 0 maximizes
i’s interim utility. We first observe that gi cannot tell i to have less than k links, because
otherwise i might increase his utility by simply adding the link with j, obtaining an additional
utility of π(ai, a
t
j), which is surely positive because of the assumption that c < π(B,A),
which implies that every payoff in the social game is positive even after subtracting the
maintenance cost. Therefore, gi tells i to have k links, which in turn implies that a new
link with some agent ` has been formed, since the link with j has been removed. We




i) such that a
′
i = ai and g
′
i is equal to gi with the only
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difference that in g′i the link with agent j is maintained and the link with agent ` is not
formed. We now argue that ui(s
′
i, s
t) > ui(si, s
t). We first note that the expected number
of mismatches in types is lower with s′i than with si, because w(i) = w(j) for sure while `’s
type is different from i’s type with positive probability: indeed, if at` = a
t
j then we have the
assumption that ni0(¬w(i), atj|st) ≥ 1, while if at` 6= atj (and hence at` = ati) then we have
that ni0(a
t





i) − π(ati, atj)
implies ni0(¬w(i), ati|st) ≥ 1.
Therefore, if i obtains the same or a larger utility in the social game by interacting with j
than with `, then we have obtained that ui(s
′
i, s
t) > ui(si, s
t). The only case where i obtains
a larger utility interacting with ` than with j is if atj 6= ai and at` = ai. Even in such a case,





i)−π(ati, atj) ensures us ui(s′i, st) > ui(si, st).
We can conclude that no strategy si such that gij = 0 can maximize i’s interim utility,
and this means that i will surely maintain the link with j if he has a revision opportunity
at time t+ 1 (and no change of course happens if i is not given a revision opportunity).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We first prove point (a). Consider a state s that is A-monomorphic, k-regular, and
type-segregated. We check that an agent who receives a revision opportunity at s would see
his utility reduced if he changes strategy. Indeed, having less than k links is suboptimal,
since π(A,A) > c. Moreover, removing a link and casting a new one brings a neighbor who
still plays A (since the state is A-monomorphic) but possibly is of a different type, hence
generating an expected loss. Finally, switching from A to B is clearly detrimental, due to
π(A,A) > π(B,A). Therefore we can conclude that no agent will ever change strategy, and
hence state s belongs to a singleton absorbing state. An analogous reasoning can be made
for a state that is B-monomorphic, k-regular, and type-segregated, where π(B,B) > c holds
because π(B,B) > π(A,A).
We now prove point (b). Consider a state s that is type-monomorphic with x on A and
y on B, k-regular and type-segregated. Take an agent of type x who receives a revision
opportunity. Maintaining less than k links is sub-optimal for him, since π(A,A) > c and,
in addition, all agents playing A are of type x so that there is no risk of a type mismatch.
Replacing an existing link with a new one has no effect on utility if the new link is cast
towards an agent who currently plays A, since all agents playing A are of type x and hence
there is no risk of a type mismatch. Replacing an existing link with a new one has a negative
effect on expected utility if the new link is cast towards an agent playing B, since all agents
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currently playing B are of type y and d > π(B,B)− π(A,A), which means that the penalty
for the type mismatch is larger than the maximum attainable gain. Finally, switching from
A to B without changing neighbors is detrimental because of π(A,A) > π(B,A). A similar
argument holds a fortiori if we consider an agent y who receives a revision opportunity. We
can conclude that any revising agent will at most reshuffle his links among agents playing
his same action, who are surely of his same type (due to the perfect correlation between
actions and types). Therefore, starting from s we can only reach other states that are type-
monomorphic with x on A and y on B, k-regular and type-segregated. This shows that an
absorbing set exists, containing type-monomorphic states with x on A and y on B. Clearly,
if we invert x with y we obtain that the same reasoning applies to type-monomorphic states
with x on B and y on A.
Then, we prove point (c). Consider a state s where k + 1 agents of type x play B,
k + 1 agents of type y play B, and all other agents play A; also, s is k-regular and type-
segregated (which is possible, since nx ≥ ny ≥ 2k + 2). Any agent playing B will never
change strategy, because he is attaining the maximum possible payoff (i.e., k(π(B,B)− c)),
which is not reachable if he switches to A, and changing neighbors comes with the risk of
a type mismatch – since some agents currently playing B are of type x and some are of
type y. Any agent playing A will never change his strategy as well. Indeed, the maximum
gain which can be obtained by removing an existing link and connecting to someone playing
B is π(B,B) − π(A,A), which is lower than the expected cost of a type mismatch (which
is equal to d/2 since n(x,B|s) = k + 1 = n(y,B|s)) because of the assumption that d >
2(π(B,B) − π(A,A)). Moreover, removing an existing link and connecting to someone
playing A brings no benefit and an expected cost due to type mismatch; deleting any of
the k links is suboptimal, since π(A,A) > c; and switching from A to B without changing
neighbors is detrimental because of π(A,A) > π(B,A). Therefore, state s belongs to a
singleton absorbing state.
Finally, we prove point (d). Consider a state s where agent i of type y plays A and
maintains no link, while all other agents play B and maintain k links towards agents of the
same type different form i. Any agent other than i will never change strategy, because he
is attaining the maximum possible payoff (i.e., k(π(B,B) − c)), which is not reachable if
he switches to A, and changing neighbors comes with the risk of a type mismatch because
some agents currently playing B are of type y. If agent i chooses to connect towards an
agent playing B, he will earn at most π(B,B), but has to suffer an expected cost of type
mismatch equal to dnx/(n − 1), which is larger than π(B,B) due to the assumption that
d > π(B,B)(n − 1)/nx. If agent i is isolated, then he is indifferent between playing A and
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B. Therefore, we have found an absorbing set that is made of states s and s′, where s′ is
identical to s with the only difference that agent i plays B instead of A.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The requirement that s is B-monomorphic is trivially a necessary condition for s ∈
SBB . We first show that, given (i), if we are not in a state such that also (ii) and (iii)
hold, then it must be the case that with positive probability we reach a state where (i),
(ii), and (iii) hold. Suppose that ai = B for all i ∈ N , but s is not k-regular and/or not
type-segregated. We observe that, for a revising agent, choosing action A would clearly be
suboptimal. Moreover, the expected payoff of forming a link with a new neighbor who plays
B is both higher than not forming that link at all (because π(B,B) − π(A,A) > d and
π(A,A) > c imply π(B,B) − c > d) and higher than maintaining an existing connection
with a type different from one’s own (because the resulting match cannot be worse, and
possibly better). Therefore, with positive probability any agent who has less than k links
and/or links with agents of a type different from his own will form new links with agents
who play B, and with positive probability these new agents are of his own type.
We now show that a state satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii) forms a singleton absorbing set. To
do so, it is enough to observe that any agent who receives a revision opportunity would see
his payoff decreased, in expectation, by changing strategy. Indeed, by choosing action A, the
agent would obtain a utility that is surely lower than his current utility k(π(B,B)− c), and
the same is true if he chooses to maintain less than k links; also, substituting an existing
link with a new one comes with the risk of linking to an agent of a type different from one’s
own, which leads to a lower expected payoff.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We provide the proof for point (a) only, as the proof for point (b) is almost identical
to the proof of point (a).
By definition, if s ∈ SAB , then s is type-monomorphic with x on A and y on B, so (i)
is trivially necessary. We first show that, given (i), if we are not in a state such that also
(ii) and (iii) hold, then it must be the case that with positive probability we reach a state
where (i), (ii), and (iii) hold. Suppose that s is type-monomorphic with x on A and y
on B, but not k-regular and/or not type-segregated. Consider a revising agent currently
playing B. We observe that choosing A is clearly suboptimal since, at most, he can obtain
k(π(A,A) − c − d) < 0 because, by (i), all agents playing A are of a type different from
his own and, by assumption, d > π(B,B)(n − 1)/ny > π(A,A). Moreover, the expected
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payoff of forming a link with a new neighbor who plays B is the same of keeping an existing
link with a neighbor who also plays B (because, again by (i), B is played only by agents
of similar type), it is strictly greater than the expected payoff of forming a link with an
agent who plays A (because, by (i), A is played only by agents of a different type), and
it is strictly greater that not forming that link at all (because π(B,B) > π(A,A) and
π(A,A) > c imply π(B,B) − c > 0). Consider a revising agent currently playing A. We
observe that choosing B is suboptimal since, at most, he can obtain k(π(B,B)− c− d) < 0
because, by (i), all agents playing B are of a type different from his own and, by assumption,
d > π(B,B)(n − 1)/ny > π(B,B). Moreover, the expected payoff of forming a link with a
new neighbor who plays A is the same of keeping an existing link with a neighbor who also
plays A (because, by (i), A is played only by agents of similar type), it is strictly greater than
the expected payoff of forming a link with an agent who plays B (because, by (i), A is played
only by agents of a different type and, by assumption, d > π(B,B)(n − 1)/ny > π(A,B),
so that π(A,B) − d < 0 < π(A,A)), and it is strictly greater that not forming that link at
all (because π(A,A) − c > 0). Therefore, with positive probability any agent who plays B
(respectively, A) and that has less than k links and/or links with agents of a type different
from his own will form new links with agents who play B (respectively, A) up to k connections
in total, and with certainty these new agents are of his own type.
We now show that the set of states satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii) forms an absorbing set.
To do so, we first observe that, for the same arguments described above, any agent who
receives a revision opportunity would see his payoff certainly decreased by changing action,
and/or by choosing to maintain less than k links, and/or by linking to new agents who play
a different action (since, by (i), they must be of a different type). Therefore, if we start from
a state where conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied, we will always remain in states where
those conditions are satisfied. We finally show that, taken any two distinct states s and s′
satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii), we can move from one to the other with positive probability.
Indeed, s = (a, g) and s′ = (a′, g′) can only differ because gi 6= g′i for some agent i; every
such agent can receive with positive probability a revision opportunity, and he can choose
with positive probability to reshuffle all his links as long as links are cast towards agents
choosing his own action, since by (i) there is no risk of forming a link with an agent of a
type different from one’s own.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We first show that 1 mutation is not sufficient to move from SAB to another absorbing
set. Consider a state s ∈ SAB , and suppose that a single mutation hits an agent possibly
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changing both his action and his network of interactions. Suppose that an agent different
from the mutant is given a revision opportunity. We claim that such an agent will not change
action and will not form new links with agents choosing an action different from his own.
To see why this is so, we observe five facts. First, forming new links with an agent who is
currently playing a different action is suboptimal, as the expected payoff is negative due to
the high penalty for a mismatch in type (because the expected payoff from such a link is
at most π(B,B) − ny




Second, if the mutant switched from A to B, then any revising agent who is maintaining a
connection with the mutant will not switch to B since he has k − 1 other neighbors playing
A and so by switching he would get (k − 1)π(A,A) + π(A,B) > π(B,B) + (k − 1)π(B,A)
(the inequality holding because k ≥ 2 and A is the risk-dominant action). Third, if instead
the mutant switched from B to A, then any neighboring revising agent will not switch to
A since he can keep playing B, remove the link with the mutant and form a new link with
another agent playing B (who exists because ny ≥ 2k+ 1) which gives him kπ(B,B)− kc >
π(A,A) + (k − 1)π(A,B) − kc. Fourth, changing action is clearly suboptimal for an agent
who is not maintaining a connection with the mutant. Finally, we observe that when the
mutant is given a revising opportunity, he will certainly choose to have k links towards
agents playing the same action he was playing before the mutation, because only doing so
he can avoid to pay the cost d > π(B,B) since all other agents’ action is perfectly correlated
with their type; given this, it follows that the mutant will also choose to play the action
he was playing before the mutation, since this allows him to coordinate. From these five
observations it follows that, after that a single mutation has occurred, the system will surely
go back to a state where conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) in point (a) of Lemma 2 are satisfied,
hence belonging to SAB .
A similar reasoning can be applied considering SBA in the place of S
A
B , thus obtaining that
R(SAB) ≥ 2 and R(SBA ) ≥ 2. In what follows we show that, if in addition we have that:




then R(SAB) and R(S
B
A ) can be computed considering only mutations that hit agents of a
single type – either x or y.
We start by providing a sufficient condition to have that m mutations hitting agents of
type x are enough for the system to leave SAB with positive probability. By Lemma 2, we
know that SAB is a single absorbing set. So we can choose a specific state in S
A
B to start from,
and in particular we can choose a state where there exists a cluster made of k + 1 agents of
type x (i.e., gij = 1 for any i and j in the cluster). If m mutations hit m distinct agents
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in the cluster inducing them to switch action from A to B (and with no change to their
interaction networks), and if the following inequality is satisfied:
m(π(B,B)− c) + (k −m) max{0, π(B,A)− c} > k(π(A,A)− c), (2)
then all non-mutants in the cluster who receive a revision opportunity will find it optimal to
choose to perform action B while not changing their interaction networks. So, with positive
probability the system reaches a new state that belongs to an absorbing set different from
SAB (indeed, at least the k + 1 agents of type x in the cluster will never go back to action
A). We also observe that other agents of type x might then find it profitable to switch to
action B, and that all agents of type y will keep playing action B. Finally, we note that (2)
is surely satisfied when m = k.
Suppose now that, starting from a state s ∈ SAB , mx mutations hit agents of type x, my
mutations hit agents of type y, so that state s′ is reached from which another absorbing set
can be reached with positive probability. Since we know that (2) is satisfied when m = k,
then in the following we focus on the case where mx +my < k.
We first observe that at least one of the following two inequalities must be satisfied in s′:
mx(π(B,B)− c) + (k −mx) max{0, π(B,A)− c} ≥ k
[
π(A,A)− c− dmy
nx − 2k +my
]
;(3)
my(π(A,A)− c) + (k −my) max{0, π(A,B)− c} ≥ k
[
π(B,B)− c− dmx
ny − 2k +mx
]
.(4)
To see why, suppose that both (3) and (4) are not satisfied. Then, no agent of type x who
is given a revision opportunity finds it profitable to play action B (due to the failure of (3)),
and no agent of type y who is given a revision opportunity finds it profitable to play action
A (due to the failure of (4)). For the mutant this is true a fortiori, since he can interact
with smaller number of mutants – being himself one of the mutants. Hence, sooner or later
all agents of type x will go back to play A and all agents of type y will go back play B.
When we have perfect correlation between types and actions, it is obvious (because of the
assumption that d > π(B,B)(n − 1)/(ny)) that revising agents will choose to maintain k
links with agents choosing their same action (and hence having their same type). Therefore,
if both (3) and (4) are not satisfied, then from s′ no other absorbing set can be reached.




inequality (4) is false. To understand this, it is enough to re-write (4) with < instead of
≥, and to obtain an explicit bound on ny (getting rid of mx by making the new inequality
harder to be satisfied). Therefore, inequality (3) must hold.
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We then observe that, if inequality (3) holds, then inequality (2) is implied by the
assumption that ny > 2k +
kd
π(B,B)−max{π(A,A), π(A,B)}
. To understand this, we fix
m = mx+my, we take the difference between the left-hand side of (2) and the left-hand side
of (3), and we set it larger than the difference between the right-hand side of (2) and the
right-hand side of (3). Working out such inequality we obtain a bound on nx that is implied
by ny > 2k +
kd
π(B,B)−max{π(A,A), π(A,B)}
(once it is noted that ny < nx). This means
that, if mx mutations hitting agents of type x and my mutations hitting agents of type y
allow the system to leave SAB with positive probability, then mx + my mutations hitting
agents of type x only are also sufficient for the system to leave SAB with positive probability.
We can repeat all the previous arguments with SBA in the place of S
A
B . The only difference
is that mx and my have inverted roles, and the same occurs for nx and my. Summing up, it
is true that, if ny > 2k +
kd
π(B,B)−max{π(A,A), π(A,B)}
, then we are allowed to focus on
mutations hitting only agents of one type, in the attempt to determine R(SAB) and R(S
B
A ).
Finally, we focus on mutations hitting only one type of agents, and we determine R(SAB)
and R(SBA ). We consider a state s ∈ SAB , and we observe that we already know that m
mutations that hit agents of type x inducing them to switch from A to B are enough to leave
SAB with positive probability, if inequality (2) is satisfied. We remark that such inequality is
also necessary for such an exit from SAB . Indeed, it is immediate to observe that, if (2) is not
satisfied, then no agent of type x who is given a revision opportunity will find it profitable
to play action B, and agents of type y will clearly keep playing action A. Furthermore, once
a mutant goes back to action A, the gain (potentially negative) of choosing B over A for
agents of type x is further reduced, while agents of type y never find it profitable to play A
over B. Sooner or later, perfect correlation between types and actions will be restored, and
a k-regular and type-segregated state will be reached, belonging to SAB . We denote with m
the minimum m such that inequality (2) is satisfied. We note that m ≥ k.
We now consider mutations hitting agents of type y who switch from B to A. As long
as at least k + 1 agents of type B keep choosing B, then mutants will sooner of later go
back to B (due to the perfect correlation between B and y, and the fact that B is the
payoff-dominant action). Since ny ≥ 2k+ 1, this means that at least k+ 1 mutations hitting
agents of type y are required to leave SAB . Since m ≥ k, we can conclude that R(SAB) = m.
We can repeat exactly the same arguments with SBA in the place of S
A
B , thus obtaining that





Proof of Lemma 4
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Proof. The proof begins by showing that, starting from a generic state s ∈ Q, another state
ŝ can be reached with positive probability such that it satisfies properties that help in the
following construction of a path from ŝ to an absorbing set Q` ⊆ SAA ∪ SBB ∪ SAB ∪ SBA .
Preliminarily, we define βx(s) ⊆ Nx as the set of agents of type x at state s who are
playing A and have at least one best reply strategy where either action B is played, or a new
link towards an agent currently playing B is cast, or both. Similarly, define αy(s) as the set
of agents of type y such that, at state s, they are playing B and have at least one best reply
strategy where either action A is played, or a new link towards an agent currently playing
A is cast, or both. We now show how the system can move with positive probability from
state s to a state ŝ where βx(ŝ) = ∅ and αy(ŝ) = ∅.
Starting from state s, with positive probability all and only the agents in βx(s) ∪ αy(s)
will receive a revision opportunity, and will choose a best reply strategy where, either action
B (respectively, action A) is played, or a new link towards an agent currently playing B
(respectively, A) is cast, or both. Call s′ the state reached after these updates. If βx(s
′) = ∅
and αy(s
′) = ∅ then we are done; otherwise we iterate the updating process, giving revision
opportunities to all and only the agents in βx(s
′) ∪ αy(s′). We observe that this iteration
will yield a state ŝ with βx(ŝ) = ∅ and αy(ŝ) = ∅ in a finite number of repetitions. This is
so because agents who switch from A to B (respectively, from B to A) exit definitely set
βx(s) (respectively, set αy(s)), and agents who cast a new link towards an agent currently
playing B (respectively, A) can be part of set βx(s) (respectively, set αy(s)) for at most k
times (since k is the maximum number of links that each agent can maintain).
Let us denote with NxA(ŝ) the set of agents of type x who are playing action A at state
ŝ, and with NyB(ŝ) the set of agents of type y who are playing action B at state ŝ. The
proof now proceeds by considering 4 possible cases concerning the emptiness/non-emptiness
of the sets NxA(ŝ) and NyB(ŝ). For each case, we construct the needed sequence of states
from ŝ ∈ Q to a state in Q` that is either monomorphic or type-monomorphic.
Case 1. Suppose first that NxA(ŝ) 6= ∅ and NyB(ŝ) 6= ∅. We apply the following path-
building procedure.
Consider a single mutation that hits an agent j of type x who is playing action B at ŝ.
If no such agent exists, we are done. Otherwise, suppose thar after the mutation agent j





j) such that a
′
j = âi, g
′
jh = ĝih for every h 6= i, j, and g′ji = ĝij. We now observe
that 3 properties hold for every agent h ∈ NxA(s′): agent h has no best reply where (i) action
B is chosen, or (ii) a new link towards an agent playing B is cast, or (iii) an existing link
towards an agent of type x playing A is removed unless he is certain to find an agent of type
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x when casting a new link towards an agent playing A. (i) and (ii) come from the fact that
agents belonging to NxA(ŝ) have, by construction, no best reply where action B is chosen
or a new link towards an agent choosing B is cast; the same holds for the same agents a
fortiori at state s′ (where agent j has switched from B to A), and it also holds for agent j,
who is copying agent i after mutation. (iii) comes from the simple observation that, given
the optimality of choosing A, it cannot be optimal to remove a link from an agent of type x
playing A unless he is certain to find an agent of type x when casting a new link towards an
agent playing A.
For similar reasons, analogous properties hold for the agents belonging to NyB(s
′) (=
NyB(ŝ)): no agent of type y who is playing B has a best reply where action A is chosen, or
a new link towards an agent playing A is cast, or an existing link towards an agent of type
y playing B is removed unless he is certain to find an agent of type y when casting a new
link towards an agent playing A.
The above three properties imply that any state s′′ that is reachable with positive
probability in the next period of the unperturbed dynamic is such that, for every agent
h ∈ NxA(s′), (1.) the number of h’s neighbors of type x choosing action B has not increased,
i.e., nhxB(s
′′) ≤ nhxB(ŝ), (2.) the number of neighbors of type x choosing action A has not
decreased, i.e., nhxA(s
′′) ≥ nhxA(ŝ), (3.) the probability of mismatch for a new link towards







and (4.) the probability of type mismatch for a new link towards an agent choosing action







Analogous inequalities, of course appropriately adjusted, hold for agents belonging to
NyB(s
′). Altogether these inequalities imply that, for the agents in NxA(s
′) ∪ NyB(s′), the
3 properties holding at state s′ also hold at state s′′. By induction, we can conclude that
the same properties will hold forever, and hence an absorbing set must be reached where
the number of agents of type x playing A never falls below nxA(s
′) = nxA(ŝ) + 1, and the
number of agents of type y playing B never falls below nyB(s)
′ = nyB(ŝ).
Starting from any state s′ in this absorbing set, and following the reasoning done at the
beginning of the proof for state s, a state ŝ′ where βx(ŝ
′) = ∅ and αy(ŝ′) = ∅ can be reached
with positive probability. At state ŝ′, there exist at least nxA(ŝ) + 1 agents of type x playing
A, and nyB(ŝ) agents of type y playing B. Then, following the above argument, a single
mutation allows to reach another absorbing set where the number of agents of type x playing
A is at least nxA(ŝ) + 2, and the number of agents of type y playing B is at least nyB(ŝ).
Given the finiteness of the set Nx, an absorbing set where all agents of type x play A must
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eventually be reached and the number of agents of type y playing B is at least nyB(ŝ). This
completes the procedure.
The same path-building procedure can now be repeated, constructing a sequence of ab-
sorbing sets, with each step requiring a single mutation, and where the minimum number of
agents of type y playing B increases by at least 1 at each step, while the minimum number
of agents of type x playing A always remains nx. Given the finiteness of the set Ny, at the
end of this procedure a state is reached where all agents of type x play A, and all agents of
type y play B; at such a state, all agents find it optimal to have exactly k links with agents
choosing the same action, and hence will end up having k connections with agents of the
same type; by Lemma 2, we know that the absorbing set set SAB has been reached.
Case 2. We now suppose that NxA(ŝ) = ∅ and NyB(ŝ) 6= ∅. We apply the procedure
described above to agents in NyB(ŝ), thus obtaining that a single mutation per step is
sufficient to move along a sequence of absorbing sets, where the number of agents of type y
playing B increases by at least 1 at each step, until all agents of type y play B. Starting from
any state s′′ in the absorbing set that has been reached, and following the reasoning done
at the beginning of the proof for state s, a state ŝ′′ where βx(ŝ
′′) = ∅ and αy(ŝ′′) = ∅ can
be reached with positive probability. We know for sure that NyB(ŝ
′′) = Ny. If NxA(ŝ
′′) 6= ∅,
then we can apply the path-building procedure to agents in NxA(ŝ)
′, and reason analogously
to what done for case 1, so reaching the absorbing set SAB .
If instead NxA(ŝ
′′) = ∅, then all agents of type x are playing B at state ŝ′′. The only
possibility that some agents of type x are indifferent between playing A and playing B is
that they are isolated (an agent i is isolated if gij = 0 for all j ∈ N). If they want to cast
new links with agents choosing B, with positive probability they will do so and will be lucky
enough to link to agents of type x. These agents now strictly prefer B over A. If more
than one agent of type x remains isolated, then all such agents can jointly switch from B
to A with positive probability; in the subsequent period, these agents will find it optimal to
connect among themselves as playing A now implies to be an x and there is no risk of type
mismatch; this leads with positive probability to a state ŝ′′′ where βx(ŝ
′′′) = ∅, αy(ŝ′′′) = ∅,
and NxA 6= ∅. Then, the path-building procedure described in case 1 can be applied starting
from ŝ′′′, and the absorbing set SAB is eventually reached. Finally, if at most one agent of
type x is isolated and indifferent between A and B, then a single mutation can hit such an
agent and let him connect with other agents of type x playing B, so that an absorbing set
belonging to SBB is reached.
Case 3. Suppose that NxA(ŝ) 6= ∅ and NyB(ŝ) = ∅. This case runs as in case 2, with
reversed roles between x and y and, when only one agent of type y is isolated, leading to an
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absorbing set belonging to SAA .
Case 4. Finally, we consider the case in which NxA(ŝ) = ∅ and NyB(ŝ) = ∅. All agents
of type x find it optimal to choose B and to have k links towards agents playing B (who
are surely of type x), while all agents y find it optimal to choose A and to have k links
towards agents playing A (who are surely of type y). The absorbing set SBA is so necessarily
reached.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Suppose to start from SAB . As shown in the proof of Lemma 3, after the formation
of a cluster of k+ 1 agents of type x (which happens with positive probability starting from
any s ∈ SAB) it is enough to have R(SAB) mutations hitting the agents in such a cluster (in
particular, making them switch from action A to action B while keeping their interaction
network fixed) to move the system to a state from which, with positive probability, a new
absorbing set Q̃ is reached where at least those k + 1 agents of type x choose B, and all
agents of type y keep choosing B.
If Q̃ ⊆ SBB , we are done. Otherwise, consider a single mutation hitting an agent of type
x who currently plays A, making him choose action B and cast all his connections towards
agents choosing action B. With positive probability, the mutant casts all his links towards
agents of type x (which, by construction, are at least k+ 1). This leads the system to either
SBB or to another absorbing set where the number of agents of type x playing B has increased
by at least 1, while all agents of type y keep playing B. By repeating this argument, SBB is
surely reached within a finite number of steps each of which requires 1 mutation only.
The same reasoning can be applied to SBA in the place of S
A
B , completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. We show in the following that, starting from state s ∈ SAA ∪ SBB , we can reach SAB
following a path of absorbing sets such that a single mutation is sufficient to move from
one absorbing set to its successor in the path. The same arguments can be repeated for SBA
instead of SAB , completing the proof.
Suppose that to be in state s ∈ SBB . Suppose also that a single mutation hits an agent,
say i, of type x making him switch to action A and no links. Call this new state s′. Since
d > π(B,B)n−1
ny
, at s′ agent i does not want to cast new links towards agents playing B; so
all states which are reachable with positive probability from s′ with one round of revision
opportunities are such that i maintains no links. Moreover, if i is the only isolated agent of
type x and no other agent wants to switch to action A, then s′ must belong to an absorbing
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set; otherwise, we reach a new state s′′ which belongs to a new absorbing set where either
i forms links with other isolated agents of type x who (with positive probability) switch to
play A or some agents currently maintaining a link towards i switch to action A. With a
further single mutation, another agent of type x who is currently playing B can be made
switch to A, severe all his current links, and connect to and only to agents of type x who are
playing A; this leads to a new state s′′ belonging to a new absorbing set where the number
of agents of type x playing A has increased. We can iterate the last passage until we get to
some state in SAB .
Suppose now that s′ ∈ SAA . We can apply an argument similar to the one just described
(with the only difference that mutations affect agents of type y) and draw an analogous
conclusion.
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